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GETTING EVICTED FOR THE ACTIONS OF
OTHERS: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT
Abstract: Section 1437d(11(6) of the United States Housing Act of 1937
seeks to eliminate the dangerous conditions in America's public
housing complexes by providing housing authorities with the ability to
combat the drug crisis through streamlined third-party-action evictions.
Both history and substantive due process challenges to this law reveal
significant problems, however, with providing management with broad
discretion to evict tenants uninvolved in or unaware of a third party's
illegal activities. This Note proposes that Congress amend § 1437d( /) (6)
to require that public housing tenants have actual or constructive
notice, based on an objective standard, of a non-household member's
prohibited activities in order to be evicted. This proposal effectively
balances tenant interests with legislative intent to achieve efficient,
effective, and fair public housing reform.
INTRODUCTION
Virgie Green was an "exemplary tenant" of her public housing
complex.' She lived in her apartment for twelve years and served as a
volunteer representative of her complex on the resident council
board. 2 One day when she was not at home, Akisha Martin, a visiting
acquaintance of Ms. Green's daughter, was arrested for selling drugs
in the apartments Even though Ms. Green was unaware of Ms. Mar-
tin's drug-related activities, she was evicted from her unit for the drug
dealing because of a lease provision making the tenant responsible for
any criminal activity taking place in the apartment. 4 In 1995, in Hous-
ing Authority of New Orleans v. Green, the Louisiana Court. of Appeals
Hous. Auth. of New Orleans v. Green, 657 So. 2d 552, 553 (La. Ct. App. 1995). Green
is an exemplary illustration of the eviction of an innocent tenant for third-party actions
and at least one conunentator introduces the topic of innocent tenant evictions with this
case. Nelson H. Mock, Punishing the Innocent: No-Fault Eviction of Public Housing Tenants for
the Actions of Third Parties, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (1998).
2 Green, 657 So. 2d at 552-53.
3 Id. at 553.
4 Id.
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upheld Ms. Green's eviction .° This case raises the issue of whether
housing authorities should evict a public housing tenant for another
individual's activities even when the tenant is unaware of the conduct.
Why is a tenant's personal involvement in illegal activities not consid-
ered in decisions to evict tenants and their families who often have no
alternate source of housing?°
In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act ("ADAA") as
an amendment to the United States Housing Act of 1937 ("Housing
Act") to combat the drug crisis in public housing.? Section
1437d(O (6) of the Housing Act requires public housing agencies to
incorporate a provision into public housing leases providing that ten-
ants may be evicted if the tenant, any member of the tenant's house-
hold, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control engages
in criminal or drug-related activity.° This legislation was intended to
decrease drug-related activity and its attendant. crime by evicting prob-
lematic residents who engage in or condone illegal activities that
place other public housing tenants at risk. 9
There is little debate over the eviction of lease-signing tenants
under § 1437d (/) (6) for a tenant's own illegal activities because hous-
ing authorities are evicting these leasehold tenants for their own viola-
tions of the lease.° Section 1437d(/) (6), however, also provides for
"third-party-action" evictions that enable public housing authorities to
evict leasehold tenants for the actions of third parties, such as other
5 Id. at 552 (holding that the tenant could be evicted even though she lacked knowl-
edge of a guest's possession of illegal drugs in the apartment).
8
 Kristen D.A. Carpenter, Promise Enforcement in Public Housing: Lessons from Rousseau
and Hundertwerssen 76 Tut,. L. REV. 1073, 1091 (2002) (stating that public housing residents
do not perceive that they have choices about where, how, or with whom they live and that
public housing is filled with tenants who simply have no other alternative).
7
 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub, L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). The ADAA
is the authorizing statute that amends the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1994). See Dean
P. Cazenave, Congress Steps Up War on Drugs in Public Housing—Has It Gone One Step Too Ear?,
36 Los,. L. REV. 137, 137 (1990) (stating that the inadequacy of housing authorities in deal-
ing with the drug crisis prompted Congress to pass the ADAA).
8 42 U.S.C. § 14374 (4 (6).
9 See Ryan Johnson, Criminal and Drug Related Evictions from Public Housing for the Activi-
ties of Third Parties, I Los'. J. Pun. INT. L. 49, 50 (2000) (stating that Congress ought to
clean up public housing by snaking leasehold tenants guarantors of third-party conduct).
10 See Dep't Hous. & Urban Dec v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128-29 (2002) (involving the
evictions of several tenants for the actions of other household members and guests). Cases
challenging § 1437d(4(6) evictions focus on the activities of third parties, not on the evic-
tion of leasehold tenants who engage in the statute's prohibited activities. See id.; Green, 657
So. 2d at 553 (involving the eviction of a tenant for a guest's illegal activities).
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household members and guests," Ms. Green's case illustrates that
some housing authorities do not consider fault, such as a tenant's per-
sonal involvement in, or knowledge of, illegal activities, before in-
itiating eviction proceedings against a leasehold tenant under
§ 1437d(/) (6) for third-party actions. 12 In response, evicted tenants
challenged these no-fault, third-party-action evictions under
§,1437d(/) (6) on legislative intent and statutory interpretation
grounds by arguing that Congress did not intend to evict leasehold
tenants uninvolved in or unaware of another person's illegal activi-
ties.° Opponents of the law also argued that no-fault, third-party-
action evictions under § 1437d(/) (6) violate the substantive due proc-
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by improperly imposing li-
ability on innocent individuals."
Until recently, the fact that no-fault, third-party-action eviction
cases under § 1437d(1)(6) were litigated in several courts resulted in
inconsistent judicial holdings.° On the one hand, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals in Memphis Housing Authority v. Thompson, in 1999,
held that no-fault, third-party-action evictions under § 1437d (/) (6) are
proper because tenants contractually agreed to such liability.° On the
" 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (0(6).
12 See Green, 657 So. 2d at 553.
13 See Rucker v. Davis, No. C98-00781CR13, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *7-8 (N.D.
Cal. June 19, 1998) (referring to the arguments made by evicted tenants that interpreting
the law as allowing innocent tenant evictions is unlawful and that the eviction of innocent
tenants was not intended by the statute), vacated by 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by
222 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2000), releg granted, 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub
110M. Dep't of Hons. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 533 U.S. 976 (2001), rev 'd by Dept Hous. Sr
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
14 Green, 657 So. 2d at 553 (stating that the evicted tenant challenged the eviction as a
violation of her due process rights); Cazenave, supra note 7, at 141-49 (considering poten-
tial substantive due process challenges for overbreadth, vagueness, and personal responsi-
bility to innocent tenant evictions). See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Id. Substantive due process rights have
been interpreted to void arbitrary limitations of individual freedom of action. JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.1 (4th ed. 1991).
15 Green, 657 So. 2d at 552 (upholding tenant evictions for a guest's illegal activities);
Hons. Auth. of Jersey City V. Thomas, 723 A.2d 119, 121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)
(refusing to evict an Innocent tenant, who did not engage in prohibited activities, for the
criminal activity of another); Memphis Hous. Auth, v. Thompson, No. 02A01-9812-CV-
00356, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 1999) (upholding the
eviction of a public housing tenant for failing to cause one of her guests to refrain from
engaging in drug-related activity in the apartment), rev d, 38 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. 2001).
16 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506, at *11-12. In Thompson, the tenant and her three chil-
dren were evicted when the father of the tenant's youngest child was arrested in the
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other hand, in 1999, the New Jersey Superior Court in Housing Author-
ity °Hersey City v. Thomas refused to evict tenants who had no involve-
ment in, nor prior knowledge of, another's illegal conduct because of
the unfairness of punishing innocent individuals for the criminal ac-
tivities of others)?
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in 2002, in De-
partment of Housing & Urban Development u Ruche; however, seemingly
settled the debate over no-fault, third-party-action evictions under
§ 1437d(/) (6). 18
 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the unanimous
Court, upheld the constitutionality of evicting tenants for the activities
of their guests and household members under § 1437d (/) (6), regard-
less of a leasehold tenant's involvement in, or knowledge of, another
person's illegal activities. 19
 The Court reasoned that no-fault, third-
party-actions evictions under § 1437d(/) (6) are constitutional because
the statutory language is clear and because the evictions result from a
lease provision authorized by Congress and affirmatively agreed to by
public housing tenants.2°
This Note focuses on no-fault, third-party-action evictions under
§ 1437d(/)(6) and argues that holding § 1437d(/)(6) constitutional
did not address important concerns with no-fault, third-party-action
evictions. 21
 To address these concerns, this Note proposes that Con-
gress amend § 1437d(/) (6) to require a tenant's actual or constructive
notice, based on an objective standard, of a non-household member's
criminal activities before eviction. 22 Part I reviews the historical back-
ground of public housing in the United States, focusing on the rea-
sons Congress enacted the ADAA. 28
 This Part also details competing
arguments for and against no-fault, third-party-action evictions under
§ 1437d(/) (6) based on the statute's legislative history and intent.21
apartment for possessing cocaine. Id. at *5. The tenant had no prior knowledge of the
guest's illegal activity. Id.
17
 723 A.2d at 120 (declining to uphold the eviction of a tenant who had no knowl-
edge of a guest's cocaine possession because it is fundamentally unfair to punish an indi-
vidual for the criminal activity of another person). Thomas involved the eviction of a lease-
hold tenant for the drug possession of the tenant's son, who was a household member. Id.
at 119-20.
1° See 535 U.S. at 127-28.
'9 Id. All members of the Court joined in the opinion except justice Breyer who took
no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 126-27.
20 Id. at 130,135.
21 See id. at 127-28; infra notes 185-214 and accompanying text.
22 See infin notes 184-239 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 31-57 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
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Part II discusses Bucket; where the U.S. Supreme Court rejected chal-
lenges to § I437d(/) (6) and explicitly upheld the constitutionality of
no-fault, third-party-action evictions. 25 Part III examines arguments
and concerns supporting and opposing no-fault, third-party-action
evictions under § 1437d(l) (6). 26 This Part details substantive due pro-
cess challenges to no-fault, third-party-action evictions under
§ 1437d(/) (6) for overbreadth, vagueness and personal fault, and the
concerns raised by these claims. 27 Alternately, Part III also discusses
contract law and legislative intent arguments offered to support
§ 1437d(/) (6). 26 Finally, Part IV argues that holding § 1437d (0(6) to
be constitutional did not address important historical and substantive
due process concerns with no-fault, third-party-action evictions under
§ 1437d(/) (6). 29 As an effective solution that balances these concerns
with the law's legislative intent, Congress should amend § 1437d (/) (6)
to require public housing tenants to have actual or constructive no-
tice, based on an objective standard, of a non-household member's
illegal activities before eviction."
I. THE PUBLIC HOUSING CRISIS AND THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT
A. Background on Public Housing, the Public Housing Crisis
and Enactment of the Anti-DrUg Abuse Act of 1988
Congress created public housing in the United States by enacting
the Housing Act in an effort to assist states and localities responding
to the shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of
lower income." Under the Housing Act, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development ("HUD") provides funds to local public
housing authorities responsible for implementing federal housing
regulations and distributing subsidies to low-income families to help
them pay for housing." Changes in federal housing regulations and
policies, therefore, have important effects on public housing tenants
25 See infra notes 72-94 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 95-183 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 97-143 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 144-183 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 184-214 and accompanying text.
58 Sec infra notes 184-239 and accompanying text.
51 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (1) (1994) (declaring the policy of public housing).
52 Tenant Based Assistance: Housing Choice Voucher Program, 24 C.F.R. § 982 (1999)
(stating that responsibility for day-to-day administration of public housing is delegated to
local authorities). The CFR also provides the guidelines to local authorities for calculating
a public housing tenant's share of the rent based on income. Id.
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because the continued existence of their homes depends on the
goodwill of Congress." By 1997, there were roughly 4 million indi-
viduals living in approximately 1.4 million units throughout the
United States. 34
Initially, Congress established public housing to provide comfort-
able and affordable residences for individuals and families in need of
transitional assistance." Congress intended to provide "good inex-
pensive homes for good, hardworking people, so they could care for
their children, hold down their jobs and eventually save enough, if
they chose, to move into homes of their own." Public housing ten-
ants often have no alternatives for housing and are comprised of a
fragile population that is overwhelmingly minority and very poor. 37 A
substantial number of residents are single parents or elderly persons
having difficulties paying rent, putting food on the table, and clothing
their Children." These tenants and their families rely heavily on out-
side personal networks and relationships for support and face grave
adversity in the event of eviction because they often are forced into
homelessness or temporary shelters." Over the years, many notable
33 Johnson, supra note 9, at 50.
34 U.S. Dept of Hous. & Urban Dcv., 1997 Picture of Subsidized Households Quick Facts, at
http://www.huduser.org/datasets/assthsg/picgwik.hunl
 (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
35 See Mock, supra note 1, at 1498.
33
 Remarks Announcing the 'One Strike and You're Out Initiative in Public Housing,
32 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 582 (Mar. 28, 1996).
37 U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., A Picture of Subsidized Households-1998, at
http://wwwhuduser.org/datasets/assthsg/statedata98/index.htail  (last visited Sept. 1,
2003) (swing that over half of public housing households are minorities and the average
income for subsidized households is $9,500 per year with seventeen percent having in-
conies below $5,000 a year); Carpenter, supra note 6, at 1091 (stating that public housing
tenants often have no alternative to public housing); Mock, supra note 1, at 1499 (stating
that public housing tenants are a fragile population).
38
 A Picture of Subsidized Households-1998, supra note 37. Two-fifths of public housing
households have single parents and one-third of households are elderly. Id.; Mock, supra
note 1, at 1499 (stating the difficulties that public housing tenants face).
39 See Mock, supra note 1, at 1499 (stating the serious consequences flowing from evic-
tion such as children missing school and adults missing work, which result in an increase
of the likelihood of falling deeper into poverty); Harry J. Wexler, Hope VI: Market
Means/Public Ends—The Goals, Strategies, and Midterm Lessons of HUD's Urban &vitalization
Demonstration Program, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HMS. & Own•. DB% L. 195, 213 (2002) (stating
that public housing is often rebuilt on same sites where failed housing has been demol-
ished because of the valuable personal networks and support systems that have evolved at
many of these sites).
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Americans moved from public housing to prominence, a fact that il-
lustrates the value of public housing's transitional nature,*
A startling contrast, however, has been documented between
what public housing was intended to be and what its deteriorated
condition is today.'" Commentators use terms such as "hell" and
"prison camp" to describe the "social tragedy of life in the worst of
America's public housing projects." 42 The dramatic rise in the avail-
ability and use of drugs in the 1980s and the attendant problems of
violence and crime have made public housing complexes dangerous
places to live.* Housing authorities, however, have been unable to
combat this drug epidemic effectively and have lost control of their
projects." The buildings crumble in decay from lack of maintenance
and vandalism.* Many residents are afraid to walk the hallways strewn
with empty crack vials, used condoms, and excrement, where muggers
and drug dealers have put out the lights.* Children often are put to
sleep in bathtubs or underneath beds to prevent random bullets from
striking them. 47
Because of the drug crisis, public housing tenants and their fami-
lies no longer are guaranteed decent places to live, and many have
become prisoners in their own homes. 48 The terrifying effects of the
drug crisis and the inability of housing authorities to address these
problems were the focus of a study conducted by the Committee on
Government Operations ("Committee") in 1988. 49 The Committee
found that local public housing authorities were having difficulty
filling units because of the dangerous living conditions caused by
49 Mock, supra note 1, at 1498 (stating that President Jimmy Carter, Bill Cosby, Isiah
Thomas, Whoopie Goldberg, Kenny Rogers, and Elvis Presley are among many notable
Americans who have lived in public housing).
41 See Johnson, supra note 9, at 49 (stating that drugs, violence, corruption, and pov-
erty are likely to surround societal images of public housing projects today).
42 Robyn Minter &layers, High Noon in Public Housing: The Showdown Between Due Process
Rights and Good Management Practices in the War on Drugs and Dime, 30 URB. LAW. 573, 573
(1998).
45 H.R. REP. No. 100-702, at 3 (1988); Smyers, supra note 42, at 573-74 (slating that
residents must pay tribute to gun-toting teenagers to enter their own buildings, ride the
elevator, or get the mail).
44 See H.R. REP. No. 100-702, at 3 (stating efforts of housing authorities was not ade-
quate assistance to combat drug activities in public housing); Smyers, supra note 42, at 606.
45 Smyers, supra note 42, at 574.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 573.
45 Sec id. at 574.
49 11.R. REP. No. 100-702, at 1.
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drug abuse and drug dealers.5° The study also noted the proven link
between drugs and crime and concluded that HUD's response to the
drug crisis was "woefully inadequate." 51 The Committee recom-
mended that HUD and Congress provide local public housing agen-
cies the "equipment" they need to win the war against drugs in public
housing.52
The Committee's criticism of HUD's inadequacy in dealing with
public housing's drug crisis prompted Congress to enact strict legisla-
tion to clean up the nation's housing projects." At the heart of Con-
gress's attempt to remedy the drug crisis in public housing is the
ADAA, which amended the Housing Act. 54
 Section 1437d(/) (6) of the
Housing Act, as later amended and in its present form, requires that
all public housing agencies incorporate a clause in its leases providing
that:
[A]ny criminal activity that threatens the health, safety or
right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants
or any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises,
engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the
tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the
tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy. 55
Section 1437d(/) (6) clearly permits housing authorities to evict ten-
ants for third-party actions. 56
 A debate, however, arose as to whether a
tenant could be evicted under the law without fault, such as involve-
ment in, or knowledge of, illegal activities, because § 1437d(!) (6) does
not provide a standard for evicting tenants for third-party conduct. 57
" Id. at 3.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 4 (stating that 1-IL/D needs funding for modernization and repair of units, se-
curity, and drug education).
53 See Cazenave, supra note 7, at 139; Smyers, supra note 42, at 608-10.
54
 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (1994); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102
Stat. 4181 (1988).
55 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(0 (6).
56 Sec id.
57 See id.; Haus. Auth. ofJersey City v. Thomas, 723 A.2d 119, 121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999) (imparting a fault requirement for third-party-action evictions by refusing to
evict a tenant who did not engage in illegal activities); Memphis Hons. Auth. v. Thompson,
No. 02A01-9812-CV-000356, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29,
1999) (upholding no-fault eviction of a tenant who did not engage in illegal activities),
rev d, 38 S.W.3d 504 (2001).
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B. Competing Inteipretations of § 1437d(l)(6) Based on
Legislative History and Intent
With § 1437d(/) (6), Congress intended to evict problematic pub-
lic housing residents by making leasehold tenants guarantors of third-
party conduct. 68 Based on the statute's plain language, HUD and sev-
eral federal and state courts determined that § 1437d(/) (6) permits
no-fault, third-party-action evictions by imposing strict liability on
public housing tenants. 59 This interpretation permits tenants who are
uninvolved in, or unaware of, alleged drug-related activities to face
eviction for another individual's conduct. 60 In contrast, several courts
and legal commentators reached the opposite conclusion by using a
fault-based interpretation of § 1437d(/) (6)." Under this view, Con-
gress did not intend to evict innocent tenants, and, instead, evictions
under § 1437d (/) (6) require a tenant's knowledge of, or some degree
of involvement in, the alleged illegal activity before eviction. 02
Both supporters and opponents of no-fault, third-party-action
evictions under § 1437d(/) (6) point to legislative history and intent to
support their respective views.° Section 1437d(!) (6)'s legislative his-
tory and intent, however, are unclear and provide no decisive answer
to this debate." On the one hand, the Code of Federal Regulations
("CFR"), which governs the administration of HUD programs, gives
59 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (l) (6); Johnson, supra note 9, at 50.
59 See, e.g., City of S. San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 369
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1995) (involving the eviction of a tenant when the tenant's son was
caught in the apartment with drugs); Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. v. Lor, 591 N.W.2d
700, 704 (Minn. 1999) (involving the police finding the tenant's son in possession of
firearms); see also Barclay Thomas Johnson, The Severest Justice is Not the Best Policy: The One-
Strike Policy in Public Housing, 10 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & Cwrv. Derv. L. 234, 242 (2001)
(stating that HUD and several courts interpreted the law to allow no-fault evictions and
impose strict liability on tenants).
Secjohnson, supra note 59, at 242 (stating that under a strict liability interpretation,
a court only considers if there is a connection between the tenant and the party involved
in the alleged criminal acts).
GI Rucker v. Davis, No. C98-00781CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *38-39 (N.D.
Cal. June 19, 1998) (refusing to uphold the eviction of a tenant not involved in illegal ac-
tivities by granting an injunction), vacated by 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by 222
F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2000), reltg granted, 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 533 U.S. 976 (2001), rev'd by Dep't Hous. & Urban
Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002); Thomas, 723 A.2d at 120 (refusing to evict "unknow-
ing" tenants for criminal activity of another); Mock, supra note 1, at 1497 (opposing strict
liability and proposing a fault-based standard for third-party-action evictions under 42
U.S.C. §1437d(1)(6)).
62 SCCJOhl1S011, supra note 59, at 242.
e See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
1238	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 44:1229
local public housing agencies the discretion to consider all the cir-
cumstances of a case before eviction .° Thus, the CFR, arguably, shows
intent not to evict innocent tenants because it allows local housing
authorities to consider the seriousness of the offense, the extent of
participation, and the effect the eviction would have on the house-
hold before initiating eviction proceedings against a tenant."
On the other hand, HUD supports no-fault, third-party-action
evictions under § 1437d(/) (6) by stating that these evictions uphold
the ADAA's legislative intent of improving public housing communi-
ties by evicting problematic tenants. 67
 HUD takes the stance that the
lease provision imposes an affirmative obligation on tenants to pre-
vent prohibited activities by third parties." HUD reasons that Con-
gress's decision to evict tenants for the crimes of others is reasonable
and necessary to carry out the ADAA's primary intent of promoting
the general welfare of public housing communities. 69 Furthermore,
HUD states that it would be problematic to evict tenants on a showing
of individual fault because of the difficulties of proving a tenant's
knowledge of, or ability to foresee, criminal activities." Because the
overriding legislative goal is to rid public housing of undesirable ten-
ants, HUD reasons that a rule allowing tenants to escape sanctions
because of the difficulties in proving fault frustrates legislative in-
ten t. 71
IL NO-FAULT EVICTIONS UNDER § 1437d (/) (6) UPHELD BY
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING e..92 URBAN DEVELOPMENT V. RUCKER
HUD reasons that the statutory language of § 1437d(/) (6) of the
Housing Act and its legislative goal of improving the general welfare
of public housing communities support no-fault, third-party-action
evictions tinder § 1437d(1)(6).72 Based on this interpretation of the
65
 Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(/)(5)(vii)(B)
(1999). ,
66 See id.; Johnson, supra note 9, at 53 (stating that the CFR shows intent not to evict
innocent tenants for third-party action).
67 See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
66 Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560 § 3.3.1 (Oct.
11, 1991) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 966).
69 Id.
7° Id.
71 Id. (stating that if a household member's criminal activity is grounds for lease ter-
mination, then the tenant has reason to try to control or prevent the activity to protect the
tenant's right to continued occupancy).
72 Id.
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statute, local housing authorities initiated eviction proceedings
against tenants, innocent of any personal involvement in or knowl-
edge of illegal third-party activities, in numerous cases." Litigants and
legal commentators responded by challenging no-fault evictions un-
der § 1437d(1) (6) on statutory interpretation, legislative intent, and
constitutional grounds. 74 The inconclusiveness of § 1437() (6)'s leg-
islative intent and divergent views concerning the imposition of liabil-
ity on tenants for the illegal activities of third parties resulted in in-
consistent judicial holdings."
The United States Supreme Court's recent holding in 2002, in
Department of Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker, seemingly ended
the debate over no-fault, third-party-action evictions of public housing
tenants under § 1437d(1) (6)." The case was brought by public hous-
ing tenants against whom housing authorities instituted eviction pro-
ceedings for the alleged drug-related activities of guests and other
household members. 77 The tenants challenged HUD's interpretation
of § 1437d(1) (6) on statutory interpretation and constitutional
grounds by arguing that § 1437d(/) (6) does not permit the eviction of
innocent tenants," Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 8-0
unanimous Court, however, reversed the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit decision in Rucker v. Davis by holding that
75 See, e.g., 'Hons. Auth. of New Orleans v. Green, 657 So. 2d 552, 553 (La. Ct.
App. 1995); Memphis Hons. Auth. v. Thompson, No. 02A01-9812-CV-000356, 1999 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 506, at *5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 1999), mid, 38 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. 2001);
see atio Johnson, supra note 9, at 56-59 (citing numerous cases where the ADAA has been
challenged by tenants based on the initiation of eviction proceedings by housing agencies
under the lease provision).
74 Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 1998) (sw-
ing that the evicted tenants challenged 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (1)(6) no-fault, third-party-action
evictions on statutory interpretation and constitutional grounds), vacated by 203 F.3d 627
(9th Cir. 2000), vacated try 222 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2000), rehk granted, 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir.
2001), cert. granted sub nom. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 533 U.S. 976 (2001),
ref/ 'd by Dep't Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002); Green, 657 So. 2d at 553
(challenging the law on constitutional grounds); Cazenave, supra note 7, at 141-49 (chal-
lenging the law on substantive due process grounds).
75 City of S. San Francisco Hons. Auth. v. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rpm 2d 367, 372 (App.
Delft Super. Ct. 1995) (upholding the eviction of tenants for the illegal activities of
household members); Hous. Auth. of Jersey City V. Thomas, 723 A.2d 119, 121 (Ni. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1999) (refusing to evict an innocent tenant, who did not engage in prohib-
ited activities, for the criminal activity of another); Thompson, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506,
at *6-7 (upholding the eviction of a public housing tenant for failing to prevent one of her
guests from engaging in drug-related activity in the apartment),
76 535 U.S. 125, 127-28 (2002).
77 Id. at 129.
78 Id.
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third-party-action evictions are constitutional under § 1437d(/) (6),
regardless of whether tenants knew, or should have known, about the
criminal activities of household members or guests. 79
The Supreme Court relied on the plain language of the statute to
conclude that Congress intended to permit no-fault, third-party-action
evictions under § 1437d(1)(6). 80 The Court pointed to the text of
§ 1437d(/) (6) and ruled that Congress's decision not to impose any
qualifications in the statute and the use of the term "any" to modify
"drug-related criminal activity" precludes any knowledge require-
ment.81 Thus, the Court concluded that any drug-related activity, "not
just drug-related activity that the tenant knew, or should have known,
about," is grounds for eviction.82 In addition, the Court compared
§ 1437d(() (6) to the civil forfeiture statute and reasoned that the for-
feiture statute, which Congress amended at the same time as the
ADAA and provides for a knowledge requirement, shows that "Con-
gress knew exactly how to provide an 'innocent owner' defense and
did not provide one in the ADAA." 83
Additionally, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit was incorrect
in concluding that the plain reading of the statute leads to absurd re-
sults.84 The Supreme Court held that it is not "absurd" that local hous-
ing authorities sometimes evict a tenant who had no knowledge of
drug-related activity because regardless of knowledge, a tenant who
"cannot control drug crime, or other criminal activities by a house-
hold member which threaten health or safety of other residents, is a
threat to other residents and the project."85 The Court noted that the
statute does not require the eviction of tenants violating the lease
provision; rather, it entrusts that decision to local public housing
authorities 86
Furthermore, the Court held that no-fault, third-party-action
evictions under § 1437d(/)(6) do not violate tenants' substantive due
79 Id. at 135-36.
60 Id. at 130-31. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit's reference to
legislative history was inappropriate when the text of the statute is unambiguous. Id, at
132-33.
91 Rucker; 535 U.S. at 130-31.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 132 (stating that the civil forfeiture statute provides that no property shall be
forfeited under this paragraph by reason of any act or omission established by that
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of the
owner") .
a4 Id. at 133-34.
as Id. at 134.
86 Rucker; 535 U.S. at 134.
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process rights.87 The Court stated that there are no constitutional
doubts about Congress's affording housing authorities discretionary
eviction authority. 88 The Court expressly rejected the holding of the
Ninth Circuit that no-fault. evictions raise questions under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they permit
"tenants to be deprived of their property interest without any relation-
ship to individual wrongdoing." 89 The Supreme Court distinguished
between government actions as sovereign and as landlord. 9° The
Court held that the government is not attempting to criminally or civ-
illy regulate members of the general public through § 1437d (/) (6),
but rather, as landlord, is invoking a clause in public housing leases
that tenants agreed to and that Congress expressly required. 9 i
Finally, in upholding the constitutionality of no-fault, third-party-
action evictions under § 1437c1(/) (6), the Supreme Court made no
distinction among various actors who engage in illegal activities lead-
ing to a tenant's eviction.92 Although two of the contested evictions
involved the drug-related activities of household members and a third
involved drug possession by guests, the Court did not distinguish be-
tween household and non-household members engaging in illegal
activities that lead to eviction." The Court held that § 1437(40 (6)
unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing
authorities with discretionary authority to evict tenants for the drug-
related activities of others, regardless of who engaged in the illegal
acts or whether the tenant knew, or should have known, about the
ac tivi ty."





 Rucket 535 U.S. at 135.
c'2 See id. at 136.
93 Id. The grandsons of two tenants, both of whom were residents of the unit, were
caught in the apartment complex parking lot smoking marijuana. Id. at 128. A tenant's
daughter, who resided in the complex and was listed on the lease as a resident, was found
with cocaine and a crack pipe in her possession three blocks from the apartment. Id. A
tenant's caregiver and the caregiver's two acquaintances were found with cocaine in the
tenant's apartment. Id.
04 Id. at 130, 136.
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III. COMPETING ARGUMENTS CHALLENGING AND SUPPORTING No-
FAULT, THIRD-PARTY-ACTION EVICTIONS UNDER § 1437d (/) (6)
Before the United States Supreme Court's decision in 2002 in
Department of Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker, there was consid-
erable difference of opinion among courts and among commentators
over the eviction of tenants uninvolved in, or unaware of, third-party
conduct violating the lease provision of § 1437d (/) (6) of the Housing
Act.95
 While opponents of the law argued that no-fault, third-party-
action evictions under § 1437d (0(6) violated tenants' substantive due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, others supported
no-fault, third-party-action evictions under § 1437d(0 (6) on contract
law and legislative intent grounds."
A. Substantive Due Process Challenges to § 1437d(l)(6)
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."97 Courts have interpreted the Due Proc-
ess Clause to have substantive and procedural components. 98 On the
substantive side, due process restricts ways in which legislatures limit
individual freedoms by protecting individuals against infringement on
other constitutionally protected rights, arbitrary government actions,
and the imposition of liability on individuals innocent of personal
wrongdoing or omissions. 99
Before Rucker, several courts held that public housing evictions
were subject to Fourteenth Amendment protections because housing
agencies are state actors and evictions deprive tenants of the property
right to occupy their apartments.'" Hence, opponents of no-fault,
99 See Mock, supra note 1, at 1524 (arguing that tenants should not be held to strict li-
ability for third-party-action evictions); Smyers, supra note 42, at 610-13 (supporting meas-
ures such as the ADAA that provide managers with more discretion to solve the problems
in public housing); supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
96 See infra notes 97-183 and accompanying text.
97 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
98 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 13.1.
99 See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495
(1982) (stating that a statute may infringe on a party's constitutionally protected behaviors
such as those under the First Amendment); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03,
(1966) (stating that laws cannot be so vague that they leave tribunals free to make deci-
sions without fixed standards); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224 (1961) (holding
that guilt is personal).
'ix' See, e.g., McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1971) (considering the
function of public housing authorities to be governmental because they help the state
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third-party-action evictions under § . 1437d(/) (6) challenged the law as
violating tenants' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
rights on several grounds. 10 ' The Supreme Court in Rucker, however,
rejected substantive due process challenges to no-fault, third-party-
action evictions under § 1437d(/) (6) by holding that housing authori-
ties are invoking a lease clause that tenants affirmatively agreed to and
Congress expressly required. 1 °2 Despite the mootness of substantive
due process claims on the issue of § 1437d(/)(6)'s constitutionality,
substantive due process challenges to § 1437d(/) (6) for overbreadth,
vagueness, and personal responsibility illustrate significant concerns
with no-fault, third-party-action evictions.'"
1. Overbreadth of the Law
The overbreadth doctrine provides that a statute prohibiting
constitutionally unprotected behaviors in certain contexts violates
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment if its
broadness infringes on other constitutionally protected rights. 104 De-
spite the moonless of an overbreadth challenge on the issue of
§ 1437d(/)(6)'s constitutionality, the overbreadth argument illus-
trates the concern that no-fault, third-party-action evictions under
§ 1437d(/) (6) infringe on tenants' free association rights under the
First Amendment.'"
The United States Supreme Court, in 1982 in Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., articulated the standard to be
used in evaluating an overbreadth challenge to a law. 1" The Court
stated that an overbreadth challenge requires a showing that a statute
infringes on constitutionally protected conduct. 107 Moreover, the
realize its specific housing objectives and therefore their actions are subject to the Four-
teenth Amendment as state actors); Owens v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Stamford, 394 F.
Supp. 1267,1273 (D. Conn. 1975) (reasoning that the activities of housing authorities are
governed by due process constraints because of the amount of state regulation involved in
their creation, operation, and management).
101 See infra note 104-143 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
103 See infra notes 104-143 and accompanying text.
104 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-24, at 710-11 (1978).
105 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text; infra notes 106-114 and accompany-
ing text.
106 455 U.S. at 489. The case involved a village ordinance prohibiting sale of any items
designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs. Id. at 492. A store owner who
sold merchandise for marijuana use sued alleging that the ordinance was unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad. Id. at 491-93.
107 Id. at 489.
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United States Supreme Court in 1973 in Broadrick v. Oklahoma applied
the overbreadth doctrine to First Amendment rights by stating that a
law may be unconstitutionally overbroad if its application significantly
impairs constitutionally protected rights under the First Amend-
ment.'" In cases of overbreadth, the law is not invalidated but re-
stricted in its application against constitutionally protected rights.'"
In analyzing  no-fault, third-party-action evictions under
§ 1437d( /) (6) from the perspective of tenants and third parties engag-
ing in illegal activities, one opponent of the law notes that these
criminal and drug-related activities are not constitutionally protected
behaviors.'" Therefore, the statute's prohibition of drug-related and
other illegal activities by leasehold tenants or third parties does not
implicate substantive due process issues of overbreadth because these
illegal activities are not constitutionally protected rights."
Alternately, if the focus of the overbreadth analysis is shifted from
the criminal behaviors of tenants and third parties to the rights of
tenants uninvolved in, or unaware of, the illegal activities of others,
arguably, the right of these tenants to freely associate with others is
impaired by no-fault, third-party-action evictions.'" The First
Amendment provides for freedom of association, which protects the
right to enter into and maintain personal relationships, by stating that
no law shall be made that abridges "the right of the people peaceably
to assemble."'" Thus, based on the Broadrick Court's application of
the overbreadth doctrine to the First Amendment, no-fault, third-
party-action evictions under § 1437d(1) (6) implicate substantive due
laa See 413 U.S. 601,611-12 (1973) (stating that litigants are permitted to challenge a
statute for overbreadth based on a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very
existence impairs constitutionally protected speech or expression rights). Broadrick in-
volved Oklahoma state employees challenging a state statute regulating the political activi-
ties of state employees on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness. Id. at 602.
1" Thin, supra note 104, § 12-24, at 711 (stating that only if the protected activity is a
significant part of the law's target, and no satisfactory method exists by which to sever the
law's constitutional application from its unconstitutional one, will the law be found over-
broad).
11° Cazenave, supra note 7, at 142.
"' See id.
" 2 Id. (stating that it is unclear when the focus should be on the drug-related criminal
activities of one under the control of the tenant or on the conduct of a tenant).
" 5 U.S. Costar. amend. I; see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460-61 (1958) (stating
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs is an in-
separable aspect of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment); NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 14, § 16A1, at 1063 (stating that freedom to associate includes the right to enter
into highly personal associations with others such as the freedom to choose one's spouse
and to maintain a relationship with members of one's family).
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process issues because a tenant's right to associate with others may be
substantially impaired by fears that a guest's actions could lead to evic-
tion.'"
2. Vagueness of § 1437d (0(6)
In 1966, in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, the United States Supreme
Court held that a law violates substantive due process rights if it is so
vague and standardless that the 'public is uncertain as to the conduct
it prohibits or the statute leaves tribunals free to decide, without any
fixed standards, what is prohibited in each case. 118 Despite the moot-
ness of a substantive due process vagueness challenge to no-fault,
third-party-action evictions, a vagueness challenge illustrates the con-
cern that the absence of specific enforcement standards permits
arbitrary and discriminatory third-party-action evictions under
§ 1437d(/)(6). 1181 ' 8
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court in Grayned v. City of
Rockford articulated the standard by which a court should evaluate a
vagueness challenge to a law. 117 The Court noted that laws must "give
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." 118 In addition, the
Court emphasized that laws must provide explicit standards of en-
forcement because "a vague law impermissibly delegates matters to
policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjec-
tive basis," and such vagueness may lead to arbitrary and discrimina-
tory application. 119
Arguably, the plain text of § 1437d(/) (6) does not provide HUD
with explicit standards for enforcing evictions under the statute.'"
Furthermore, HUD is authorized to set forth detailed regulations to
114 See 413 U.S. at 611-12; Cazenave, supra note 7, at 142.
115 382 U.S. at 402-03. Giaceio involved the imposition of court costs on an individual
who was acquitted in a criminal proceeding based on a Pennsylvania statute imposing costs
of criminal prosecution on defendants even if acquitted. Id. at 400.
116 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text; infra notes 117-126 and accompany-
ing text.
117 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). Grayned involved the conviction of an individual for
violating a city anti-picketing ordinance prohibiting a person from willfully making noise
or diversion that disturbs the peace near a school. Id. at 107. The picketer was one of sev-
eral hundred protesting on behalf of "negro students at the school" when school officials
took no action in response to their grievances. Id. at 105.
118 Id. at 108 (reasoning that individuals are free "to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct" and vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning).
110 Id, at 108-09.
1" Sec 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (0(6) (1994); Cazenave, .supra note 7, at 144.
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be followed by local authorities in enforcing the law, but HUD regula-
tions provide almost no guidance to local housing authorities."' Sec-
tion 1437(1(0 (6) simply leaves the decisions to evict tenants for viola-
tions of the § 1437d(/) (6) lease provision to the judgment of public
housing agencies after consideration of "all the circumstances rele-
vant to a particular case." 122
This absence of enforcement standards for no-fault, third-party-
action evictions under § 1437d(I) (6) conflicts with the principles ar-
ticulated in Grayned because arbitrary actions that violate substantive
due process are facilitated.'" To illustrate, one opponent of the law
states that neither Congress nor HUD provides local housing authori-
ties with any standards concerning the level of proof of a guest's drug-
related activity that is needed to evict a tenant."' Thus, a tenant at
odds with management may be evicted on minimal evidence because
of local management's hopes of expelling an undesirable tenant. 125
The absence of explicit standards for enforcing § 1437d(0 (6)'s third-
party-action evictions facilitates arbitrary and discriminatory evictions
because another tenant, not at odds with management, may not face
eviction in similar circumstances. 126
3. Personal Responsibility Challenge to No-Fault, Third-Party-Action
Evictions Under § 1437d(/) (6)
In 1961, in Scales v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court stated, "in our jurisprudence guilt is personal" and noted that
the concept of substantive due process implies that liability only be
imposed on a person for that individual's own acts or omissions."'
Based on this doctrine, opponents of no-fault, third-party-action evic-
tions challenged the evictions as violations of substantive due process
rights because the law imposes liability on tenants based solely on
121 See Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(0 (5) (vii) (B)
(1999); Cazenave, supra note 7, at 194.
122 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(t) (5) (vii) (B).
125 See 408 U.S. at 108-09; Cazenave, supra note 7, at 144.
124 Cazenave, supra note 7, at 144 (questioning whether the wrongdoer must be ar-
rested for drug-related crimes or convicted before eviction proceedings can be initiated
against the public housing tenant).
125 See id.
'26 Id.
127 367 U.S. at 224. Scales involved a statute that made it a felony to acquire or hold
knowing membership in any organization advocating the overthrow of the United States
government. Id. at 205. An individual was indicted for being a member of the Communist
Party. Id. at 205-06.
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their associations with third parties behaving illegally. 128
 Despite the
moonless of substantive due process challenges to no-fault, third-
party-action evictions under § 1437d(l) (6), the personal responsibility
challenge illustrates the unfairness of holding tenants to strict liability
and the inherent problem with the statute's standard of liability. 129
In 1988, in Long Grove Country Club Estates v. Village of Long Grove,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
stated that a valid substantive due process claim against public hous-
ing authorities under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that ten-
ants show that they were (1) deprived of property (2) for an irra-
tional or invidious purpose.' 3° Concerning property deprivation, the
United States Supreme Court in 1982 in Greene v. Lindsey recognized
that public housing tenants who did not receive notice of eviction
proceedings until default judgments had been entered against them
had been deprived of a significant interest in property."' Therefore,
because public housing tenants have an interest in continued resi-
dence in their homes, § 1437d(/) (6) no-fault, third-party-action evic-
tions that take away this housing interest are governed by substantive
due process protections. 152
Arguably, the absence of a personal responsibility requirement
for evictions under § 1437d(l) (6) fulfills the irrational or invidious
purpose element of a substantive due process claim because there is
no causal relationship between the evicted tenant and the acts of a
third party that led to eviction.'" This was the reasoning applied by
the New Jersey Superior Court in 1999 in Housing Autholity °Hersey City
v. Thomas, where the court refused to uphold the eviction of a tenant
128 See, e.g., Tyson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513,516 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(pre-ADAA case challenging a tenant's eviction based on her son's arrest for engaging in
narcotics and gambling activities on the housing premises, despite the fact that he had not
lived with her for three years); see also Mock, supra note 1, at 1523 (stating that it is funda-
mentally unfair to punish an innocent person).
129 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text; infra notes 130-143 and accompany-
ing text.
15° 693 F. Supp. 640,657 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The case involved a country club owner seek-
ing to invalidate a village ordinance alleging that the ordinance's limitations on the use
and development of the land deprived him of his land. Id. at 652-53.
131 456 U.S. 444,445-46,456 (1982). A Kentucky statute permits service of process by
posting a summons in a conspicuous place on the premises of a defendant if the defen-
dant or a member of defendant's family over sixteen years of age cannot be found on the
premises. Id. Individuals challenged the statute, after service was made on them by posting
a summons on the door to their apartments, alleging that the notice procedures violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
1 " See Mock, supra note 1, at 1523.
1 " See id. at 1523-24.
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when the tenant's son, who resided in the household, was arrested for
possession of cocaine.'" The court stated that it simply would be un-
fair to remove the tenant, who was unaware of the drug-related activ-
ity, from her residence for the criminal activity of another individ-
ual. 135
Although Thomas involved the criminal activity of a household
member, § 1437d(1)(6) also authorizes a tenant to be evicted for the
actions of non-household members, guests and other persons under
the tenant's control.'" Evicting tenants for the activities of non-
household members seemingly strengthens the argument that no-
fault, third-party-action evictions under § 1437d(1) (6) violate the sub-
stantive due process principle of personal responsibility because there
is even less of a causal relationship when tenants are evicted for the
actions of individuals with whom they do not live. 137
 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1974, in Tyson.
v. New Yogi City Housing Authority, refused to uphold a tenant's eviction
brought because the tenant's adult son, who had not lived with her
for three years, was arrested for engaging in drug-related activities on
the premises. 138 The court held there . was no causal nexus between
liability and the tenant's conduct and that imposing culpability on an
individual on the basis of association is antithetical to the concepts of
personal guilt and individual responsibility. 139
Furthermore, an opponent of no-fault, third-party-action
evictions implies the existence of an inherent problem with
§ 1437d (/) (6) 's standard of liability. 140 To illustrate, in 1992, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Chavez v. Hous-
ing Authority upheld a tenant's eviction for her son's disruptive activ-
ity."1
 Housing authorities evicted the tenant even though the tenant
argued that her son did not live with her, was not a guest of hers when
134 723 A.2d 119, 119 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
135 Id. at 120.
138 42 U.S.C. § 1937d (1) (6) (1999); 723 A.2d at 119-20.
137 Tyson, 369 F. Supp. at 518-19.
"aid. at 516,518.
13s
	 at 519 (stating that the mere existence of the parent-child relationship is in-
sufficient for a causal nexus of wrongdoing where the parent is evicted for acts of the
child).
10 See Mock, supra note 1, at 1523 (stating that courts upholding no-fault, third-party-
action evictions did not require any standard of liability for the tenant).
141
 973 F.2d 1245, 1247, 1249 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the tenant's argument that
she is losing her apartment because of her familial relationship with her son lacks merit
because the tenant is not being punished for the actions of her son, but rather, for failing
to ensure that her guests do not disturb or endanger others in the complex).
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the incident occurred and the tenant was unaware of his presence at
the complex. 112 One opponent of no-fault, third-party-action evictions
under § 1437d (/) (6) criticized such a result because it is simply unfair
to evict tenants who had no practical means whatsoever to prevent the
criminal activities that result in their evictions." 3
B. Support for No-Fault Evictions Under § 1437d(1)(6)
In Ruche"; the United States Supreme Court upheld no-fault,
third-party-action evictions under § 1437d(/) (6) because the lease
provision was required by Congress and affirmatively agreed to by
tenants.'" Prior to the Rucker decision, several state and lower federal
courts upheld no-fault, third-party-action evictions under similar con-
tract law, refusing to look beyond the four corners of the lease. 145 In
addition, supporters of § 1437d(/) (6) reason that no-fault, third-party
evictions are necessary to achieve the law's primary objective of im-
proving the general welfare of public housing communities. 146
I. Con tract Law
Before the Rucker decision, several state and lower federal courts
refused to look beyond the four corners of the lease clause and con-
cluded that no-fault, third-party-actions evictions under § 1437d(/) (6)
did not violate tenants' substantive due process rights. 147 Although
evictions for the actions of others appear as if the courts are imposing
liability on innocent tenants, this is not the rationale courts apply to
uphold no-fault, third-party-action evictions. 148 Contractual responsi-
bility for acts of a unit occupant is a conventional tool of landlord-
tenant law that facilitates housing management. 149 Thus, courts only
determine whether a tenant breached an obligation in the lease for
which the prescribed sanction of eviction is imposed and refrain from
142 Id. at 1248.
143 Mock, supra note 1, at 1523-24 (stating that the tenant is serving as "involuntary
surrogate" for the guilty party).
144 SIT supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
145 See infra notes 147-156 and accompanying text.
148 See infra notes 157-183 and accompanying text.
141 Johnson, supra note 9, at 55.
148 Memphis Hons. Auth. v. Thompson, No. 02A01-9812-CV-00356, 1999 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 506, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 1999) (relying on contract law to uphold a ten-
ant's eviction and stating that the language of the provision is clear and unambiguous);
Johnson, supra note 9, at 70.
149 Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,560 § 3.3.1
(Oct. 11, 1991) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 966).
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inquiring about the wisdom of the contractual terms. 15° Because a
tenant signs a lease that has incorporated the ADAA's mandatory pro-
vision, a tenant may not be excused from contractual liability merely
by arguing that the tenant did not know, could not foresee, or was
unable to control the criminal behaviors of others.m
Furthermore, courts upholding no-fault, third-party-action evic-
tions under contract law address substantive due process issues by
concluding that there is some personal fault by the tenant. 152 These
courts concede that tenants being evicted are innocent of the crimi-
nal activity that is the cause of the lease termination. 153
 Nevertheless,
as the Tennessee Court of Appeals held in 1999 in Memphis Housing
Authority v. Thompson, the lease gives a tenant an affirmative obligation
to prevent illegal activity and the tenant simply is being sanctioned for
failing to live up to this contractual obligation. 154 Similarly, in 1966, in
City of South San Francisco Housing Authority v. Guiltory, the California
Superior Court dismissed the argument that substantive due process
rights require tenants to have knowledge of another's conduct before
eviction. 155
 The court reasoned that the eviction did not violate Four-
teenth Amendment rights because the tenants were evicted not for
the conduct of another, but for failing to meet their own obligation of
preventing illegal activities by others as agreed to in the public hous-
ing lease. 15°
2. Accomplishing Legislative In tent
In addition to contract law, supporters of no-fault, third-party-
action evictions under § 1437d(1) (6) argue that the termination of
tenancy, even if a tenant was uninvolved in or unaware of illegal activi-
150 Johnson, supra note 9, at 70-71.
151
 See id. at 71.
152
 City of S. San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 372 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1995).
'" See id.; Johnson, supra note 9, at 68 (providing a list of cases that recognized the in-
nocence of the tenants for the third-party activity for which they were evicted).
154 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506, at *12 (stating that the tenant was properly evicted for
failing to cause one of her guests to refrain from engaging in drug-related criminal activity
in violation of the lease provision).
155 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372. The police department found the tenant's son in possession
of drugs during a search of his bedroom and the public housing agency initiated eviction
proceedings against the tenant and household members. Id. at 369. In addition, the court
distinguished the case before it with Tyson, 360 F. Stipp. at 518, by stating that Tyson in-
volved the conduct of those not living in the tenant's household while the son in this case
was a member of the household. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
155 Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
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ties, is supported by the ADAA's legislative intent of improving the
general welfare of public housing communities.'" HUD supports no-
fault, third-party-action evictions under § 1437d(l) (6) because tenants
not seeking to control illegal activities in public housing are threats to
other residents in their respective communities. 158 Similarly, one sup-
porter of no-fault, third-party-action evictions under § 1437d(1) (6)
argues that the expansion of tenant rights after the mid-1960s hob-
bled the ability of housing authorities to combat the drug crisis and,
therefore, less protection of tenants' due process rights is necessary to
improve public housing conditions effectively. 09
HUD concludes that if tenants can be evicted for any criminal
activity by household members or guests, tenants will not engage in
illegal conduct. and will prevent such behavior by others.m Thus,
HUD reasons that prohibiting no-fault, third-party-action evictions
under § 1437d(/) (6) undercuts tenants' motivation to prevent illegal
activities by others, thereby harming public housing communities.'"
In Rucker; the Supreme Court accepted HUD's legislative intent ar-
gument. by noting that public housing tenants who do not seek to
control crime by others are threats to other residents in the projec0 62
One supporter of no-fault, third-party-action evictions further
justifies the law on grounds that managerial discretion is necessary for
effective public housing reform.m Prior to the mid-1960s, the federal
government vested substantial power in local housing agencies to
manage complexes freely, helping to maintain the quality of public
housing.'" Housing authorities possessed wide discretion over admis-
sions, evictions and rules of resident conduct. 165 Building managers
actively discriminated in public housing admissions by judging desir-
ability based on racial and economic preferences.m Tenants were
evicted for no reason, or based on subjective conclusions as having
become "undesirable." 167 Management also imposed rules relating to
157 See infra notes 158-183 and accompanying text.
158 Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,560 § 3.3.1
(Oct. 11, 1991) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 966).
159 See infra notes 163-183 and accompanying text.
160 Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. at 51,560.
t6t Id.
182 See 5351.5. at 134.
163 See Slayers, supra note 42, at 613.
164
 Id. at 586.
165 Id. at 578, 581, 583.
166 id. at 579.
167 Id. at 581-82 (stating that public housing tenants in the past had almost no protec-
tion against eviction),
1252	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 44:1229
tenant conduct and sanctioned tenants failing to comply with
the regulations.' 68 This discretionary management "unquestionably
helped maintain the order and quality of public housing" by allowing
managers to protect the projects they supervised from dangerous and
disruptive tenants. 109
 As a result, public housing complexes in the past
were well maintained and sources of pride in many communities. 170
Arguably, this discretionary system of public housing manage-
ment did not survive the "due process revolution," when courts, be-
ginning in the mid-1960s, determined that tenants were entitled to
greater protection against the actions of housing authorities by "virtue
of their constitutionally guaranteed due process rights."'" During this
time, courts invalidated desirability policies and mandated standard-
ized admissions procedures that opened public housing to many high-
risk applicants who would not have been admitted in the past. 172
Courts also upheld public housing evictions only if there was "good
cause."173 This "good cause" requirement for evictions invalidated
many of the traditional justifications for evicting public housing ten-
ants, such as poor housekeeping, and thus, troublesome tenants who
would have been evicted or threatened with eviction in the paSt be-
came nearly judgment proof. 04
 Moreover, courts invalidated sanc-
tions for violations of tenant rules and regulations without notice and
hearings, and housing agencies abandoned the use of tenant regula-
tions to avoid the costs of these court-mandated procedures.'"
The due process revolution made public housing authorities ill
prepared to handle the dramatic rise in the availability and use of
drugs, especially crack cocaine, in public housing during the late
1970s and 1980s. 176
 The policy changes in admissions, evictions and
enforcement Of tenant rules hobbled the ability of public housing
agencies to effectively and efficiently deal with problematic tenants
168 Smyers, supra note 42, at 583. Rules of tenant conduct were often enforced with an
"iron hand" by managers and governed many aspects of daily public housing life such as
housekeeping standards and unit inspections. Id.
166
 Id. at 586.
178 Id.
171 Id. at 587.
172
 Id. at 589, 593.
173 See Smyers, supra note 42, at 595.
174 Id. at 596; see Cordrey v. Hous. Auth. of Holyoke, No. 80-G881, 1980 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17835, at *10-12 (stating that a public housing tenant's failure to keep the apart-
ment clean did not constitute good cause for eviction).
172 See Smyers, supra note 42, at 597.
176 1d. at 603; see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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engaging in drug-related activities)" Thus, many public housing
authorities lost control of their projects to drug dealers, and the con-
ditions in the complexes deteriorated) 78
Because of the inability of housing authorities to combat drug-
related activities, a consensus developed in the late 1980s that the ef-
fects of the due process revolution were complicating efforts to make
public housing communities safe and decent places to live)" There
was a sense that the legal system was overvaluing the rights of individ-
ual tenants over the needs of neighbors and communities)" As a re-
sult, initiatives were undertaken to attempt to restore some of the
helpful management practices of the earlier years, a "due process
counter-revolution."181 The ADAA was one such measure, enacted to
restore managerial discretion and reform public housing by stream-
lining the evictions of problematic tenants)" Thus, this commentator
supports no-fault, third-party-action evictions under § 1437d(1) (6),
because some individual rights must be limited by the competing de-
mands of the public housing community by giving housing authorities
the discretion to manage public housing complexes freely)"
IV, A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO § 1437d (1) (6)
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court in Department of Hous-
ing & Urban Development v. Rucker upheld the constitutionality of no-
fault, third-party-action evictions under § 1437d (1) (6) of the Housing
Act) 84 The Court's holding, however, did not address historic and
substantive due process concerns with no-fault, third-party-action evic-
tions under § 1437d(0 (6))" Congress should amend the law to reach
an effective solution that balances these concerns while upholding
the law's intended reform of public housing. Accordingly, Congress
should require a tenant's actual or constructive notice, based on an
objective standard, of a non-household member's prohibited activities
before eviction. A notice requirement for third-party action evictions
effectively addresses the substantive due process and historical con-
177 See Smyers, supra note 42, at 603.
1 " Id. at 606.
179 Id. at 608.
185 Id.
181 Id. at 609.
182 Smyers, supra note 42, at 610.
185 Id. at 615.
184 See supra notes 76-94 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 104-143 and accompanying text.
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terns with § 1437d (I) (6). 186 Moreover, distinguishing between house-
hold and non-household members and evaluating a tenant's actual or
constructive notice, based on an objective test, effectively balances the
notice requirement with § 1437d(/)(6)'s intended public housing re-
form.' 87
A. Substantive Due Process Concerns and History Compel a Notice
Requirement for Third-Party-Action Evictions Under § 1437d(()(6)
1. Substantive Due Process Concerns Compel a Notice Requirement
for Third-Party-Action Evictions
The substantive due process challenges to no-fault, third-party-
action evictions under § 1437d(/) (6) illustrate significant concerns
with the law that are not addressed by the mere fact of its constitu-
tionality.' 88
 Amending § 1437d(/) (6) to require a tenant's notice of
another's illegal conduct before eviction effectively addresses con-
cerns related to no-fault, third-party-action evictions raised by the sub-
stantive due process challenges to the statute for overbreadth, vague-
ness and personal responsibility. 189
A notice requirement effectively would address concerns that
tenants' free association rights are impaired by no-fault, third-party-
action evictions under § 1437d(/)(6). 190 In 1973, in Broadrick v. Okla-
homa, the United States Supreme Court held that a law would be
found overbroad in violation of substantive due process rights if its
application significantly impairs other constitutionally protected
rights. 191
 Arguably, the overbreadth challenge to § 1437d( 0 (6) shows
that tenants' free association rights are impaired by no-fault, third-
party-action evictions because public housing tenants may be reluc-
tant to associate with others or entertain guests because of fears that a
guest's actions may lead to eviction. 192 Despite the constitutionality of
§ 1437d(/) (6), this infringement on association rights should be ad-
dressed because public housing residents rely on outside personal
networks for support and these valuable relationships should be left
186 See infra notes 188-214 and accompanying text.
187
 See infra notes 215-239 and accompanying text.
mn See supra notes 97-143 and accompanying text.
lag See infra notes 190-204 and accompanying text.
199 See infra notes 191-194 and accompanying text.
' 91 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
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intact. 193 Therefore, requiring tenants to have notice of a third party's
illegal activities before initiating eviction proceedings mitigates ten-
ants' fears of associating with others because tenants will only avoid
associating with individuals whom the tenants know engage in illegal
activities.'"
In addition, amending § 1437d (I) (6) to require notice of a third
party's illegal activities before eviction also addresses concerns regard-
ing arbitrary and discriminatory evictions under § 1437d( /) (6). 195
One opponent of no-fault, third-party-action evictions under
§ 1437d ( /) (6) notes in a vagueness challenge that the law lacks
specific enforcement standards because decisions to evict under the
§ 1437d( /1 (6) are left to the judgment of local housing authorities
after consideration of all the circumstances of a case. 196 This discre-
tion permits potentially arbitrary and discriminatory evictions because
between two tenants unaware of their guests' illegal activities, only
one may be evicted based on factors such as that tenant being at odds
with management. 197 Despite the constitutionality of no-fault, third-
party-action evictions under § 1437d (/) (6), arbitrary and discrimina-
tory practices should not be tolerated because public housing resi-
dents face grave consequences, such as homelessness, in the event of
eviction. 198 Thus, a regulation requiring notice of a third party's illegal
activities reduces arbitrary and discriminatory evictions by providing
housing authorities with a specific standard for enforcing third-party-
action evictions under § 1437d( /) (6).
Furthermore, requiring tenants to have notice of a third party's
illegal activities before eviction addresses problems with
§ 1437d(/) (6)'s standard of liability.m Opponents of the law chal-
lenged no-fault, third-party-action evictions under § 1437d (/) (6) as
violating the substantive due process principle of personal responsibil-
ity because of the absence of a causal relationship between the evicted
tenant and third-party-action that led to eviction. 200 In Rucker, how-
ever, the Supreme Court held that a causal nexus does exist between a
tenant's conduct and liability because tenants are at fault for failing to
193 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
194 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 115-126 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text.
. 197 See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
199 Sec infra notes 200-204 and accompanying text.
2°0 See supra notes 127-143 and accompanying text.
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prevent others from engaging in prohibited activities in violation of a
contractual obligation."' Arguably, however, there exists an inherent
problem with § 1437d(/) (6) because no-fault, third-party-action evic-
tions hold tenants to an impractical standard of liability to which few
tenants can compty.202 For example, in 1992, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Chavez v. Housing Authority upheld
the eviction of a tenant for her son's actions even though the tenant
was unaware of her son's presence at the complex and her son was
neither a household member nor a guest of the tenant at the time of
the incident. 203
 Public housing residents, therefore, are cast out onto
the streets despite having no practical means whatsoever to prevent
the illegal activities of others. 204 Requiring tenants to have notice of
another person's wrongful activities addresses this concern by provid-
ing a practical standard of liability so tenants are evicted only for ac-
tivities they knew about and could have prevented.
2. History Compels a Notice Requirement for Third-Party-Action
Evictions
A historical review of public housing conditions before and after
the expansion of tenant rights in the mid-1960s supports measures
such as the ADAA to reform public housing by streamlining the evic-
tions of problematic residents. 205 This same review of history, however,
also supports amending § 1437d(/) (6) to require tenants to have no-
tice of a third party's illegal activities before eviction to prevent the
discriminatory and arbitrary practices by housing authorities that
were pervasive in the past."°
One supporter of § 1437d(/) (6) argues that the contrast between
the state of public housing before the mid-1960s and its current dete-
riorated and dangerous conditions after the due process revolution
shows that the due process revolution's creation of centralized systems
of admissions, evictions, and tenant rules left housing authorities un-
able to combat the drug crisis by evicting the most problematic ten-
ants.207 In response to this problem, measures such as the ADAA were
2" See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
20! See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
205
 See supra notes 164-178 and accompanying text.
200 See infra notes 207-214 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 163-183 and accompanying text.
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implemented, as part of the due process counterrevolution, to pro-
vide managerial discretion for effective public housing reform. 2°8
Although the due process revolution hobbled the ability of hous-
ing authorities to respond quickly and effectively to public housing's
problems, the revolution minimized many of the discriminatory and
arbitrary practices of the past. 209 Prior to the due process revolution,
management possessed discretionary power over all facets of public
housing life and often evicted tenants for discriminatory and wholly
subjective reasons. 210 The due process revolution sought to address
these concerns because eviction poses serious consequences for pub-
lic housing tenants and their families who are often forced into home-
lessness or temporary shelter housing.2 "
Currently, the ADAA's lack of enforcement standards provides
housing officials with discretionary authority over evictions compara-
ble to the power held by managers prior to the due process revoIti-
tion. 212 Relying solely on the judgment of local housing authorities to
evict tenants under § 1437d(t) (6) for the actions of third parties is a
step backward because discriminatory and arbitrary evictions that the
due process revolution sought to eliminate may be once again facili-
tated.2 t 5 Requiring tenants to have notice of a third party's illegal ac-
tivities before eviction preserves the benefits of the due process revo-
lution by providing housing authorities with a standard for eviction
that minimizes arbitrary and discriminatory practices.214
B. A Necessary Distinction Between Household and Non Household Members
Engaging in § 1437d(1)(6)'s Prohibited Activities
In Rucker, tenants against whom housing authorities instituted
eviction proceedings for the illegal activities of third parties argued
that § 1437d(1) (6) does not permit the eviction of tenants uninvolved
in, or unaware of, the illegal conduct of others. 215 Two cases involved
the eviction of tenants for the drug-related activities of household
members while a third involved drug possession by several guests.21°
2°8 See supra notes 179-183 and accompanying text.
20B See supra notes 165-175 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
512 See supra notes 121-122,164-170 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 164-175 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
218 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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In holding that no-fault, third-party-action evictions are constitutional,
the Supreme Court made no distinction between the criminal activi-
ties of household and non-household members that could lead to
eviction. 217
This Note proposes that Congress amend § 1437d(/) (6) to re-
quire a tenant to have notice only of a non-household member's
wrongful activities before eviction. This distinction is necessary be-
cause the substantive due process concerns regarding overbreadth
and personal responsibility that compel a notice requirement for non-
household members do not support requiring notice for the actions
of household members. 218 In addition, holding household members
to strict liability for the lease obligation achieves the effective public
housing reform intended by § 1437d(1) (6). 219
The overbreadth challenge to § 1437d(1)(6) supports a notice
requirement for the activities of non-household members but not for
the conduct of household members. 22° The overbreadth challenge to
§ 1437d(O (6) shows that tenants' free association rights are impaired
by no-fault, third-party-action evictions because tenants may not asso-
ciate with others for fear that a guest's actions may lead to eviction. 221
This infringement of free association rights is a concern because pub-
lic housing tenants rely on outside personal and support networks
and these valuable relationships should be left intact. 222 This concern
for tenants' free association rights, however, clearly does not support a
requirement that tenants have notice of another household member's
illegal activities because tenants obviously already associate with other
members of the household.
Similarly, the personal responsibility challenge to no-fault, third-
party-action evictions under § 1437d(() (6) supports a notice require-
ment for the activities of non-household members but not for house-
hold members. 229 The substantive due process challenge for personal
responsibility illustrates the inherent problem with § 1437d(1)(6)'s
standard of liability because tenants may be evicted despite having no
means whatsoever to prevent the activity that lead to eviction. 224 This
217 See SUpro notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
218 See infra notes 220-226 and accompanying text.
219 See infra notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
228
 See infra notes 221-222 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
223 See infra notes 224-226 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 127-143 and accompanying text.
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concern is effectively addressed by a notice requirement for the activi-
ties of third parties by providing a practical standard of liability to
which tenants can comply. 226 This reasoning, however, is less applica-
ble in the context of household members because tenants clearly have
more of an opportunity to prevent household members from engag-
ing in illegal activities. In contrast to a case such as Chavez, where a
tenant was evicted for her son's actions even though she was unaware
of his presence at the complex and he was neither a household mem-
ber nor a guest, tenants clearly have the opportunity to prevent those
they live with from engaging in prohibited acts. 226
In addition to the inapplicability of substantive due process con-
cerns to household members, requiring tenants only to have notice of
the prohibited activities of non-household members provides for the
efficient and effective public housing reform intended by the
ADAA.227 Section 1437d (/) (6) was enacted to give housing authorities
the ability to control drug-related activities in public housing by swiftly
dealing with problematic residents. 228 Requiring tenants to have no-
tice of a household member's illegal activities impedes the ADAA's
intent because it allows problematic residents to stay in their homes
and remain threats to other residents merely because the tenant was
unaware of the prohibited conduct. 229 Holding household members
to strict liability, however, achieves the ADAA's objective of decreasing
drug-related activities in public housing by giving managers the dis-
cretion to rid complexes of the most troublesome households that
create and perpetuate public housing's problems.
C. Legislative Intent Supports an Actual or Constructive Notice Requirement
and an Objective Standard for Evaluating Notice
With § 1437d(/) (6), Congress intended to reform public housing
through the eviction of problematic households by making leasehold
tenants guarantors of third-party conduct. 23° The historical and sub-
stantive due process concerns to no-fault, third-party-action evictions
under § 1437d(/) (6), however, support amending the law to require a
tenant's notice of a non-household member's illegal activities before
225 See su pm notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
227 See infra notes 228-229 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
270 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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eviction. 231 A notice requirement does not frustrate Congress's intent;
and requiring a tenant's actual or constructive notice, based on an
objective standard, addresses standard of proof issues to achieve effec-
tive public housing reforrn. 232
 •
Requiring tenants to have notice of a non-household member's
illegal activities does not frustrate third-party-action evictions in-
tended by § 1437d(/) (6). 233 The Supreme Court in Rucker justified no-
fault, third-party-action evictions under § 1437d(1) (6) on the grounds
that tenants who cannot control criminal activities of associates are
threats to other residents in the complex. 234
 Requiring tenants to have
notice of a non-household member's illegal activities before eviction,
however, addresses historical and substantive due process concerns
with the law.235 Requiring a tenant's notice does not undercut
§ 1437d(/) (6)'s intended allowance for third-party-action evictions
because housing authorities still can evict tenants for the actions of
non-household members if they knowingly fail to prevent illegal ac-
tivities by non-household members. 238
Although a notice requirement addresses concerns with
§ 1437d(1) (6) and does not frustrate third-party-action evictions, it has
practical implications for HUD that are effectively addressed by re-
quiring a tenant's actual or constructive notice, based on an objective
standard, of a non-household member's illegal activities. 237 In sup-
porting no-fault, third-party-action evictions, HUD states that evicting
tenants on a showing of fault bars effective reform of public housing
because of the difficulties in proving a tenant's knowledge of, or abil-
ity to foresee, criminal activities. 238 Requiring a tenant's actual or con-
structive notice of a non-household member's illegal activities, how-
ever, addresses this concern because HUD can evict a tenant for a
non-household member's illegal activity based on what the tenant
should have known, rather than undertake the difficult task of prov-
ing what the tenant actually knew. In addition, an objective standard
of evaluating a tenant's actual or constructive notice further alleviates
HUD's concern over difficulties of proof. 239 Under an objective stan-
231 See supra notes 188-214 and accompanying text.
232 See infra notes 233-238 and accompanying text.
233 See infra notes 234-236 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 104-143 and accompanying text.
236 See infra notes 238-239 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 233-236 and accompanying- text.
"a See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text
239 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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dard, HUD can evict tenants based on what a reasonable person in
the tenant's position knew or should have known, rather than under-
take a subjective standard of proving knowledge or foreseeability from
the tenant's point of view.
CONCLUSION
Section 1437d(l) (6) of the Housing Act nobly seeks to eliminate
the dangerous conditions in America's public housing complexes by
providing housing authorities with the ability to combat the drug cri-
sis through streamlined third-party-action evictions. Nevertheless,
Congress must balance public housing reform with the interests of the
fragile public housing population. Both history and substantive due
process challenges to the law reveal significant problems with provid-
ing management with broad discretion to evict tenants uninvolved in
or unaware of a third party's illegal activities. Despite the 2002 United
States Supreme Court decision in Department of Housing & Urban De-
velopment v. Rucker; a mere holding of § 1437d(l} (6)'s constitutionality
did not address significant concerns with the law.
Congress should amend § 1437d(l) (6) to require public housing
tenants to have actual or constructive notice, based on an objective
standard, of a non-household member's prohibited activities in order
to be evicted. A notice requirement minimizes § 1437d(/)(6)'s in-
fringement of tenants' rights of association, avoids arbitrary and dis-
criminatory evictions, and holds tenants to a practical standard of li-
ability. Holding household members to strict liability under
§ 1437d(l) (6) provides housing authorities with the muscle to rid
public housing complexes of the most troublesome households. Fur-
thermore, requiring actual or constructive notice, based on an objec-
tive standard, alleviates the difficult burden on housing authorities to
prove what a specific tenant knew or could foresee. Amending
§ 1437d(1) (6) to require a tenant's actual or constructive notice,
based on an objective standard of proof, of a non-household mem-
ber's illegal activities before eviction effectively balances tenant inter-
ests with legislative intent to achieve efficient, effective and fair public
housing reform.
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